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Water scarcity is a global concern. 
Even in non-drought environments the 
political, economic and environmental 
costs of developing new water resources 
may favour conservation. Recent CCP 
research for Anglian Water reviews 
the effectiveness of two demand-side 
interventions to reduce residential water 
consumption: Increasing Block Tariffs 
(IBTs) and behavioural interventions.
In theory IBTs can side-step affordability concerns and are an attractive option, however the authors highlight 
the operational challenges of implementing effective IBTs. 
Robust evidence on behavioural interventions is limited, 
although socially comparative feedback appears to 
encourage water conservation. Nevertheless, since existing 
evidence is typically obtained in drought situations, one 
may question its validity for designing interventions in non-
drought situations such as the UK. The authors suggest 
that an essential first step before implementing an IBT is 
understanding a locality’s water consumers and their water 
demand. Many UK households have an unmetered water 
supply and this presents challenges both for gaining the 
necessary understanding and producing an evidence base 
around behavioural interventions.
Population growth and climate change create uncertainty 
about the ability to balance supply and the demand for water 
in general. The UK, and the south-east/east of England in 
particular, face an increasing drought risk over the next 50 
years. There are now even greater challenges in developing 
new water resources due to the economic and environmental 
costs involved and political opposition.1 An alternative to 
resource options is to use demand-side options, involving 
both price and non-price tools (see Figure 1) to reduce 
household water use. Recent CCP research2 explored 
whether Increasing Block Tariffs (IBTs) and behavioural 
interventions trialled in other industrialised countries already 
facing a high drought risk could be useful in the UK.
The law of demand suggests that increasing water prices 
should reduce the quantity of water consumed. However, 
3water demand is price inelastic,3 i.e. consumers do not tend 
to be very responsive and cut their consumptions when 
facing price increases. To achieve a significant reduction in 
demand the water price would have to increase substantially, 
which may lead to poorer households consuming water 
below an advisable level and/or facing financial hardship. 
A price mechanism where the per-unit price varies with 
consumption, such as an IBT, seeks a balance between 
the affordability and conservation objectives. Under IBTs, 
different unit prices are charged for two or more pre-
specified blocks (quantities) of water. Intuitively the idea is to 
construct a first block corresponding to the essential amount 
of water consumption during a billing period, and then 
consider subsequent blocks of consumption as increasingly 
a luxury product and price accordingly. Figure 2 illustrates 
a three-block IBT with conservation objectives. Compared 
to the uniform price tariff, pu, the IBT involves a lower 
price for consumption up to quantity q1, a higher price for 
additional consumption up to q2, and a much higher price 
for consumption above q2.
Among industrialised countries, IBTs are widely used in 
the US, some parts of Europe, such as Spain and Portugal, 
and parts of Australia including Melbourne, Perth and 
Sydney. Unsurprisingly, these areas are associated with a 
high drought risk. A review of those existing applications of 
IBTs offers two general insights: first, the structure of IBTs 
can vary considerably across geographical areas and time 
periods, and second, the effects of IBTs are mixed – some 
have reduced residential water consumption effectively, 
while others did not reduce demand, or sometimes even 
increased total consumption. This suggests that for an IBT 
to reduce water consumption successfully, it needs to satisfy 
two conditions: 1) the design of the tariff structure (including 
prices, block sizes, billing period, and the number of blocks) 
needs to reflect high quality data regarding local demand, 
and 2) consumers need to perceive and respond to the IBT’s 
price signal correctly. Both conditions are challenging to 
meet in the UK. 
Many UK households remain unmetered and their water 
bills are not based on their consumption. The limited 
evidence on the price elasticity of water demand in the UK 
suggests the scope of using water tariffs to reduce water 
consumption in the UK is currently smaller than some other 
areas of the world.4 The low variation in water expenditure 
across income groups may indicate that UK households’ 
water demand generally involves a low level of discretionary 
use. In addition, the ability of firms to experiment with 
new pricing structures depends on the flexibility of the 
regulatory regime. IBTs require experimentation to develop 
an effective block pricing schedule. However, it is an open 
question whether the UK’s political and regulatory setting 
would permit such experimentation and the charge of high 
unit prices for high consumption blocks. Despite greater 
emphasis on sustainable water use in recent years, the 
development of conservation-oriented tariffs in the UK has 
been slow. One of the main obstacles of introducing IBTs in 
the UK is the concern that water may become unaffordable 
for some large households under those tariffs. 
Furthermore, households in the UK appear to pay little 
attention to their water consumption and water price, which 
may be due to the small size of water bills relative to total 
Figure 2: A three-block IBT
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Figure 1: Price and non-price approaches to residential water demand management
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household expenditure. Most of the empirical evidence we 
reviewed is from a drought situation. It seems plausible that 
the perceived importance of water conservation will differ 
substantially between households who have experienced 
droughts and those who have not. Compared to drier 
locations, water stress in the UK is not an immediate threat 
to households’ living standards, hence, households, are 
likely to be less aware of the need for water conservation 
and are less willing to change their water use habits. 
The difficulties of introducing IBTs in the UK increases 
the attractiveness of using behavioural signals to 
encourage water saving. In water conservation, behavioural 
interventions often present different types of information to 
households and are increasingly evaluated through natural 
or constructed experiments. In an experiment, households 
are usually grouped into different “treatments” which receive 
different types of information about water use and water 
saving. By comparing treatment groups to a “control” group 
where no intervention is applied, studies assess whether the 
type of information used can reduce water consumption. 
In our review, we seek to address the effectiveness of 
alternative information types considered in the literature 
(see Table 1), and whether households’ socioeconomic 
characteristics influence the response to interventions. 
We still know very little about the effect of behavioural 
remedies on water consumption because only a handful 
of experiments have been conducted in this area, almost 
all involving small samples5 and some being affected by 
sample selection issues. The existing evidence suggests that 
technical advice on its own and without a good motivation 
for conservation rarely generates a significant reduction 
in water use. Social comparative feedback appears to be 
the intervention most likely to generate significant effects, 
however, a one-size-fits-all approach may not be effective: 
social comparison is most promising for high water users. 
When comparing interventions’ short-run and long-run 
effects, there appears to be a complementarity between 
price and behavioural interventions. High water users are 
less price-sensitive but are more likely to respond to social 
comparisons. The effect of information-based interventions 
diminishes over time whereas IBTs can become more 
effective over time, so combining the two interventions may 
lead to both immediate effect and sustained effects.
Given the currently low consumer engagement in the 
UK, attitude-led behavioural interventions highlighting the 
importance of water conservation may help to ‘set the 
scene’, prior to the introduction of IBTs, while enabling UK 
water companies to learn how to maximise the effectiveness 
of delivering water conservation messages to households. 
The main insight from our review is that we require more 
experimental studies to obtain robust results from the 
UK (where the perception of drought risk is low). Future 
experimental studies also need to address the persistence of 
the effect of information interventions on conservation, how 
socioeconomic characteristics may influence households’ 
responses to interventions, and how behavioural 
interventions interact with price incentives, such as IBTs. 
Information type Example
Technical advice Information leaflets containing water-saving tips
Norm-based information
Letters emphasising social identity and prosocial preferences, such as the importance of water 
conservation and how individual households’ effort matters for a community
Monitoring device tailored to 
specific appliances
Devices or labels with technical and conservation information for showers, washing machines etc., 
enabling usage to be monitored at the point of consumption 
General feedback Feedback on total household water use 
Socially comparative feedback Feedback comparing water use to the average of (similar) neighbours 
Emoticon feedback
Happy faces indicating social approval when water consumption is below average, and sad faces 
indicating social disapproval when consumption is above average
Table 1: Information types
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More than EUR 1.9 trillion is spent each year on public contracts in Europe. In 
a time of economic crisis, there is need to maximise the efficiency of public 
spending, in order to secure budget savings. One of the ways to achieve this is 
to deter bid rigging (collusive tendering), a practice whereby two or more bidders 
agree on aspects of their submissions like, for example, on quality or price. Bid 
rigging undermines competition among bidders and may lead to reduced quality or 
higher prices for goods that are procured by the public sector. 
In my recent research on electronically conducted auctions (e-auctions), one of the most common procurement tools 
that public bodies use in order to acquire goods or services, 
I argue that some elements of the current procurement 
practice increase the risk of collusion and that the new 
EU Directive on public procurement has not managed to 
adequately deal with those issues.
The economic significance of public procurement in 
Europe is considerable, with public authorities in the EU 
 1
spending approximately 14% of GDP on public procurement 
every year, i.e. more than EUR 1.9 trillion.2 In an attempt 
to maximize the efficiency of public spending in an era of 
austerity and continuing cuts to public purchasing, there is 
a trend towards the use of electronic communications by 
public bodies when buying supplies and services or when 
tendering public works (e-procurement). E-procurement 
offers a number of benefits such as simplified and shortened 
processes, reductions in red-tape and administrative 
6burdens as well as significant savings for all parties.3 
Electronic auctions (e-auctions) are a representative 
electronic purchasing technique, the use of which has 
nearly doubled in number during 2009 and 2010.4 Public 
procurement is regulated by two EU Directives5 which apply 
to most of the auctions organised by public bodies. Yet, 
as my research demonstrates, the regulatory framework 
and practice of e-auctions raise competition concerns as 
they may facilitate anti-competitive practices, such as tacit 
collusion and bid rigging. Collusive activities reduce the level 
of competition and undermine the main objectives of public 
procurement, such as value for money in the acquisition of 
the required goods, works or services and efficiency in the 
procurement process. 
E-auctions are a procurement tool that use web-based 
software to allow potential suppliers to compete online, in 
real time, to provide prices for the goods/services under 
auction. E-auctions can be based on price alone or other 
criteria such as quality, delivery or service levels. E-auctions 
can take two forms; they can be either reverse or forward. 
In the former, the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder 
and in the latter the bidder with the highest price wins the 
contract, for example when a company bids to purchase 
paper and magazines for recycling. The main characteristic 
of the e-auction system under the new Directive is that 
throughout each phase of an electronic auction information 
must be communicated to all tenderers in order to enable 
them to allocate their relative position compared to the other 
participants. This information may include details concerning 
prices or values submitted by other bidders as well as the 
number of participants in each phase of the auction. The 
identities of the tenderers shall not be disclosed. Another 
significant element of the new Directive is that e-auctions 
may take place in a number of successive phases. 
Moreover, the new Directive enables contracting authorities 
to close an electronic auction at a previously indicated date 
and time or when the previously indicated number of phases 
in the auction has been completed. This is a general concern 
that regards all auctions and not only e-auctions.
In my PhD chapter I argue that the new Directive raises 
a number of competition concerns, especially regarding 
e-auctions. Firstly, the sharing of information facilitates 
collusive schemes between the participants, even with their 
identities being kept anonymous. The main reason for this 
is that the circulation of price and other related information 
that is mandatory under the Directive enables the bidders 
to observe the prices at which rivals quit as well as the set 
of valid offers submitted at each round of the e-auction. In 
this way, it is possible for the members of a bidding ring to 
determine whether their co-conspirators kept their promise 
to submit, for example, ‘cover bids’, i.e. bids at an artificially 
high price or composed of special terms that are likely to 
be rejected. Thus, firms engaged in bid rigging are able 
to monitor any deviations from their collusive agreement. 
Because bidders’ identities are not disclosed, the bidding 
ring will not be able to use targeted punishments against 
the defecting bidder during the same auction. However, the 
bidding ring will still be effective in suppressing rivalry among 
members because of the knowledge that one or several 
bidders deviated. The general threat of ending the collusive 
agreement and reverse to competitive behaviour for the 
rest of the e-auction constitutes the greatest punishment 
The regulatory 
framework 
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competition 
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may facilitate 
anti-competitive 
practices, such 
as tacit collusion 
and bid rigging.
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for the deviating firm. All firms would receive their lower 
non-collusive profits. Because of the information disclosure 
required in accordance with the Directive, deviating from 
a pre-arranged collusive agreement becomes observable, 
though anonymised, which makes a bidding ring more stable 
and e-auctions more susceptible to collusion. 
Secondly, the multi-round format that an e-auction can 
take may enhance the sustainability of a bidding ring, 
especially in the context of a market whose characteristics 
raise collusion concerns. According to the economic theory 
of auction, collusion is likely to flourish when auctions repeat 
at regular intervals so that the same bunch of bidders may 
meet time and time again.6 The repeated interaction among 
tenderers, even on an electronic marketplace and without 
their identities being disclosed to each other, gives them 
a number of opportunities to observe the process of price 
formation and monitor any deviation from their pre-arranged 
collusive agreement. After all, information flows well in 
industries, especially when there are only a few suppliers 
and it may be relatively easy to identify ‘anonymous’ bidders. 
Additionally, the limited time-intervals between the rounds 
of a multi-round e-auction strengthen the enforcement 
structure of a bidding ring, as any deviating member of the 
ring may face threat of immediate retaliation at the next 
stage of the e-auction.7 
 Thirdly, the new Directive enables contracting authorities 
in e-auctions to award a contract based on price only. 
Especially the ‘lowest price’ criterion in a reverse e-auction 
raises collusion concerns. Though the lowest price criterion 
is not exclusive to e-auctions, the anticompetitive effects 
of this awarding criterion may be stronger in case of 
e-auctions, where the price is the predominant criterion 
to select the winning bid rather than the criterion of 
‘economically advantageous’.8 In an environment where the 
public purchaser does not have any specific preferences 
regarding the quality of the products/services procured and 
competition is driven only by price considerations, bidders 
may find it easier to agree on a collusive scheme, especially 
with cost symmetry and in a multi-round e-auction.9 
This increases the risk of collusion because under such 
circumstances, the bidders can more easily suppress all ring 
competition in their cartel and allocate the collusive gains 
among them.10  
The susceptibility of e-auctions to anti-competitive 
practices could be reduced by altering and reinterpreting 
the existing framework. To start with, procuring authorities 
should only disclose the minimum amount of information 
about the bidding history of other bidders. This would 
reduce the probability that deviations from the collusive 
agreement are observed, thus destabilising the bidding ring. 
For example, authorities could avoid disclosing the prices at 
which rivals quitted the auction or the number of valid offers 
submitted per round. It should be sufficient for a bidder 
competing in an e-auction to know whether its own bid is 
the leading one and what the price of the leading bid is. This 
information still enables the auctioneer to gauge the price 
that it ought to submit at the next round of the auction.11 
The contracting authority could also delay the publication of 
information to hinder collusion among auctioneers. By doing 
this, deviation of bidders from the collusive agreement will be 
delayed and so will be the punishment of the defector. It may 
also render punishment practically impossible if the e-auction 
has already closed.12 In markets with concerns about 
collusion, authorities should also consider a single round of 
e-bids rather than e-auctions with multiple phases. The one-
round format “cannot be easily manipulated to coordinate 
bidder strategies and thus constitute an anti-cartel device”.13 
The new Public Procurement Directive has not fully 
addressed the issue of collusive outcomes in e-auctions but 
contracting authorities may reduce the risk of bid rigging by 
reducing certainty for potential bid riggers and reducing the 
amount of information provided to bidders.
8Wynne Lam, Lecturer in Industrial Organisation and Competition Policy
Data as an Entry Barrier: 
Does Data Portability 
Foster Competition in 
Internet Markets?
The right to data portability under the General Data Protection Rule (GDPR) 
is generally thought to encourage consumers to switch between different 
service providers and facilitate entry of new firms. The data portability rules 
only apply to data ‘created by’ the consumer (data subject), e.g. purchasing 
patterns. However, data ‘derived by’ a firm (data controller) with the help 
of data analytics, e.g. recommendations derived from purchasing patterns, 
does not fall under the portability rule. We show that without data analytics, 
data portability can indeed facilitate switching, but with data analytics, data 
portability may hinder switching. This is because consumers, knowing that 
they can switch easily in the future, are more willing to provide data to the 
incumbent, which strengthens the incumbency advantage and creates entry 
barriers. The second effect has been neglected so far and we demonstrate 
that the overall impact of data portability on switching and entry is 
ambiguous, depending on the availability and value of big data analytics. 
9Hence, data portability facilitates switching and entry. 
However, when big data analytics are strong enough, it 
strengthens the demand-expansion effect to such an extent 
that the demand-expansion effect dominates the switch-
facilitating effect, making switching and entry difficult.
Furthermore, we show that entry deterrence is more 
likely to happen in a more innovative market. This is 
because in such a market, anticipating better firms will 
enter in the future, consumers are more likely to wait for 
the better firm and defer their data consumption. With less 
data consumption early on, the switch-facilitating effect 
of data portability becomes weaker. On the other hand, 
the demand-expansion effect becomes stronger because 
consumers are more likely to switch in the future and port 
data to the more innovative entrant. Combining both effects, 
the entry condition becomes more difficult. Thus, although 
data portability can benefit consumers by alleviating lock-in, 
it can also have an adverse effect on entry and long-term 
efficiencies. This casts doubt on the role of data portability 
in helping new firms and fostering competition. In summary, 
even though the short-term benefit of data portability is 
well grounded, the potential long-term effect requires more 
detailed analysis.
More generally, our work relates to the large economic 
literature on either switching costs or network effects.4 
However, there are few works that analyse both issues 
together. Yet, in both Lam and Liu (2018) and Lam (2017), 
we show that much of the literature that looks at these 
two issues separately provides an incomplete picture in 
the presence of both of them.5 Therefore, we believe that 
much more work is needed in this area to enable a deeper 
understanding of competition in Internet markets, where 
both switching costs and network effects are common.
A clear aim of data portability is to facilitate consumer switching and entry. There are, however, boundaries 
to the right to data portability according to Article 20 of the 
GDPR, which says: ‘The data subject shall have the right 
to receive the personal data concerning him or her, which 
he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, 
commonly used and machine-readable format and have 
the right to transmit those data to another controller 
without hindrance from the controller to which the data 
have been provided.’1 
This means that the right to data portability applies only 
to data ‘provided by’ the data subject but not inferred 
or derived data ‘created by’ the data controller. For 
example, whereas data on consumers’ shopping and 
browsing behaviour fall within the scope, inferred data for 
personalisation and recommendation (hence, data analytics) 
fall outside. Such data analytics are commonly used by big 
Internet companies such as the GAFAM (Google, Amazon, 
Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft). This also means that 
although data portability may reduce incumbency advantage, 
it does not eliminate such advantage.
Let us first consider a market without data portability. 
It is well known that in such a market, consumers will be 
locked-in to the incumbent once they are on board, even 
when a more efficient firm enters the market at a later stage. 
Moreover, the lock-in effect is stronger when consumers 
consume more data.2 This is because data consumption 
creates switching costs: they can be ‘individual’ switching 
costs (e.g. transaction and learning costs when changing 
service providers) or ‘collective’ switching costs (or network 
effects, e.g. the more friends join Facebook, the more value 
existing users derive). On the other hand, anticipating future 
lock-in, a consumer may want to refrain from consuming too 
much data, so that he/she can easily switch to a better firm.
Lam and Liu (2018) identify two ways that data portability 
changes this scenario.3 First, for a given level of data 
consumption, data portability weakens the lock-in effect 
and the incumbency advantage, as it allows data to be 
transferred more easily to the entrant. We call this the 
switch-facilitating effect. This effect is one of the most 
compelling reasons for promoting data portability. Second, a 
weaker lock-in effect encourages data consumption. That is, 
consumers, knowing that they can switch easily in the future, 
are more willing to raise their data consumption and provide 
data to the incumbent. We call this the demand-expansion 
effect, which raises the value of staying with the incumbent 
and potentially creates entry barriers.
The overall impact of data portability on entry is a priori 
ambiguous because of the existence of these two opposite 
effects. We show that when there are no, or only weak 
big data analytics, the switch-facilitating effect dominates. 
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10:25 – 10:50 Discussion
10:50 – 11:20 Break
Session 5 Supporting Industries – How Have We Done? 
11:20 – 11:45 State Aid to the Car Industry – the EU approach 
 Carlo Scarpa Department of Economics & Management, University of Brescia
11:45 – 12:10 Welfare Effects of R&D Support Policies 
 Tuomas Takalo Bank of Finland
12:10 – 12:30 Discussion
12:30 – 13:30 Lunch 
Session 6 Panel – The Future of State Aid
13:30 –15:00 Simon Coward Hethel Innovation
 Bruce Lyons School of Economics & Centre for Competition Policy, UEA
 Sheldon Mills Competition and Markets Authority
 Jenny Sugiarto KPMG  
15:00 – 15:15 Final Remarks | Kai-Uwe Kühn
15:15 – 16:00 Farewell Drinks Reception
#ccp2018conf
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Sebastian Peyer, Senior Lecturer in Law
The EU Damages Directive
and Stakeholders’ 
Involvement
Public consultations are an important tool in the law-making process, improving 
efficiency, transparency and effectiveness of regulation, and aiming at countering 
lobbying and business interests. In preparation of its Damages Directive the 
European Commission held two public consultations: the Green Paper (2005) and 
White Paper (2008) consultations on options to reform private damages actions 
for the breach of EU competition law. Our analysis of the consultation responses 
suggests that business interests dominate and that consumer interests are 
underrepresented. We argue that this might, among other factors, explain why the 
Commission did not adopt more radical proposals to encourage compensation 
claims in favour of harmed consumers or small firms.
Directive. In preparation of the Directive, the European 
Commission held two public consultations – the Green Paper 
consultation 2005 and the White Paper consultation 2008. 
Both consultations attracted a significant amount of attention 
from academics and practitioners alike. We looked at all 
318 publicly available responses that were submitted to the 
Green Paper or the White Paper. Of those 318 submissions, 
251 were drafted in either English or German and we 
subjected them to a more detailed content analysis. 
In our dataset of consultation responses we were able 
to identify the affiliation of the respondents and their 
positions on critical elements of the Directive such as 
access to information and passing-on.4 Our data show 
that respondents from larger economies in the EU or more 
mature competition law regimes dominate the consultation 
process. Stakeholders from the UK submitted 52 responses, 
followed by Germany (46), Belgium (37), France (29), Italy 
(24) and the Netherlands (16). Compared to the size of its 
economy, Belgium seems to be overrepresented but this is 
largely explained by the fact that many interest groups and 
law firms have an office or their headquarters in Brussels. 
There were also seven responses from stakeholders based in 
the United States. This does not surprise. The United States 
have been at the vanguard of private antitrust enforcement 
and often served as the reference point in the discussion 
about the reform of private damages actions. 
Lobby groups and law firms took centre stage in the 
consultation process, submitting the majority of the 
F or many years, few firms and virtually no consumers sought damages for breaches of EU competition law 
in the courts of the EU Member States.1 The European 
Commission lobbied changes to the existing legal framework 
to encourage victims of anticompetitive conduct to sue 
for compensation. The Commission’s efforts culminated 
in the EU Damages Directive that came into force at 
the end of 2014.2 The Directive aims at harmonising the 
rules for bringing tort actions based on infringements of 
EU competition law, and one of its main objectives is to 
encourage consumers and firms to bring compensation 
claims against firms that engaged in anticompetitive conduct. 
The Directive is regarded as an important milestone in the 
development of private antitrust enforcement in Europe but 
it has also been contentious for introducing, for example, the 
disclosure of documents in many civil law jurisdictions. While 
the Directive has initiated reforms in the EU Member States, 
it has also fallen short of providing strong incentives for small 
firms or consumers to sue for damages.3 For example, the 
Directive did not include mandatory rules for opt-out group 
actions and some of its proposals are likely to make litigation 
more expensive and, thus, less attractive for consumers.
To understand why the Directive fell somewhat short of 
its own compensation goal, it is important to look in the 
genesis of the Directive. While political pressure from some 
Member States may have had an influence on the final 
version of the Directive, we focus on the potential role that 
public consultation may have played in shaping the Damages 
13
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responses as shown in Figure 1. Only seven of those 
interest group responses were written by organisations 
lobbying on behalf of consumers whereas all the remaining 
submissions represented industries and non-consumer 
interests. That would explain why many submissions 
appeared to be motivated by the creation of a more 
level playing field or concerns about the exposure to 
litigation. Lobby groups were also the strongest voice 
against changes that were more likely to incentivise 
compensation claims such as better access to information 
in possession of the defendant via disclosure (a novelty 
in many continental jurisdictions). While the motivation 
for lobby groups to participate in consultations is clear, 
the considerable number of law firms that participated is 
surprising. We accept that many law firms may have a 
general interest in competition law but we wonder whether 
contributions were submitted on behalf of clients or groups 
of clients. A small number of academics or academic 
institutions submitted responses as well. Submissions from 
Governments included responses from various national 
ministries but also competition authorities and consumer 
protection agencies. 
Most of the responses are cautiously positive and 
generally supportive of the Commission’s proposals. 
The final Damages Directive seems to be the result of 
the majority’s opinion as expressed in the consultation 
responses. However, it is difficult to assess what other 
input has shaped the Directive. The European Parliament 
as well as pressure from national governments have played 
a role later in the drafting process too.
The preliminary results of our analysis indicate that 
industry organisations dominated both consultations 
and that more responses were submitted from larger 
economies or countries with more mature competition 
law systems. This may be one factor explaining why the 
Damages Directive contained few radical changes in 
favour of harmed consumers or small firms. On a more 
abstract level, the paper contributes to the discussion 
about public consultations. Open consultations are widely 
employed as a policy and regulatory tool to improve 
transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of regulation, 
aiming at widening stakeholder participation, information 
gathering and the initiation of dialogue with potentially 
affected parties.5 The Green Paper and the White Paper 
consultations have certainly improved transparency and 
triggered a debate about private actions for damages, but 
the dominance of non-consumer interest groups seems to 
question the use of public consultations as a tool to widen 
stakeholder participation.
Only seven of those 
interest group responses 
were written by 
organisations lobbying on 
behalf of consumers, all 
the remaining submissions 
represented industries and 
non-consumer interests.
Figure 1
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UKERC-funded Project: 
Energy Affordability and 
Old Age: Expenditure 
versus self-reported 
perceptions
David Deller, Senior Research Associate
Catherine Waddams Price, Professor of Regulation
The government has promised to improve energy affordability1 as part of its 
pledges to help those who are ‘Just About Managing’. The legislation to cap energy 
prices for ‘disengaged’ customers, which is expected to receive Royal Assent this 
summer, is an important part of fulfilling this pledge. However the cost of energy 
has had political salience for far longer and has often been framed as whether older 
people can afford sufficient energy.
In 2001 the then government committed to eliminate fuel poverty 
and, since 1997, Winter Fuel 
Payments (WFP) have been made 
to all those over pensionable age. 
While WFP’s title is linked to energy, 
it is actually an income transfer, one 
costing the government around £2bn 
per annum. The increasing generosity 
of WFP not only represented a 
significant increase in support linked 
to energy it also represented a 
fundamental shift in the balance of 
support, away from low incomes 
(which determines receipt of Cold 
Weather Payments2) towards old 
age. The central policy question, as 
opposed to the political question, is 
whether this substantial help is being 
targeted at those who need it most? 
The answer depends partly on how 
need is measured.  
In the UK policy discussions around 
energy affordability are often framed 
Figure 1 - Median ENEXShr by Age of Household Head, 1992-20145
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in terms of ‘fuel poverty’, a term associated with particular 
statistical definitions of ‘unaffordable energy’ based on 
the value of energy expenditures relative to income. CCP 
research3 has used large scale household survey data to look 
at both the broad question of energy affordability across all 
UK households, and the narrower question of how different 
fuel poverty measures vary in the households they identify 
as being unable to afford heat. First, in Figure 1, we consider 
how the proportion of expenditure devoted to energy 
(ENEXShr)4 varies across households of different ages.
Figure 1 shows that ENEXShr is higher in households with 
a head aged over 70 than in younger age groups, and is 
especially high for the over-80s. However, the ‘young retired’, 
i.e. those aged between 60 and 70, many of whom receive 
WFP, have similar ENEXShr to younger households. The 
time trend of lower ENEXShr in the early-2000s reflects lower 
energy prices during this period.  
In 2001 the UK government statistically defined fuel 
poverty as households where energy expenditures exceeded 
10% of income. The dotted yellow line in Figure 2 shows that 
those who devote more than 10% of their income to energy 
fell during the early-2000s, but increased after 2004-5, 
mirroring the time trend in ENEXShr shown in Figure 1. The 
solid blue line shows the percentage of households classified 
as fuel poor according to the Low Income-High Cost (LIHC) 
definition which supplanted the 10% metric as the official 
metric in England in 2012. The LIHC metric is a ‘relative’ 
metric since it defines a household as fuel poor if their energy 
expenditure exceeds the median and their income, after the 
deduction of energy expenditure, is below 60% of median 
income. The relative nature of the LIHC metric explains its 
stability through time.
While both the 10% and LIHC metrics are based on 
energy expenditures, an alternative approach is to record 
whether householders perceive themselves as being 
able to afford sufficient energy. This type of self-reported 
perception is reported by the orange line which is the 
proportion of households stating they could not afford to 
Figure 2: Rates of alternative fuel poverty metrics,
2001-02 to 2008-096
Fuel poor households 
contain a higher 
proportion of pensioner 
households than non-
fuel poor households.
keep their home adequately warm. The percentage self-
reporting inadequate warmth is far lower than for either of 
the ‘expenditure based’ metrics. This result is significant: 
the majority of the households identified as fuel poor by 
the 10% and LIHC metrics do not consider themselves as 
lacking adequate warmth.  
Across the three fuel poverty indicators, Figure 3 shows a 
striking difference in the proportion of fuel poor households 
that are pensioner households. For both the expenditure 
metrics, fuel poor households contain a higher proportion 
of pensioner households than non-fuel poor households. 
In contrast, households reporting an inability to afford 
adequate warmth contain a lower proportion of pensioner 
households than those not reporting difficulties. This may be 
because pensioner households have a different view of what 
constitutes ‘adequate’ heating and/or prefer cooler houses; 
or because they are less inclined to express difficulties. 
Figures 2 and 3 therefore pose significant questions for 
policymakers regarding the targeting of support according 
to expenditure based fuel poverty definitions. While WFP, 
being an income transfer, should always improve the 
welfare of recipient households, if a household prefers 
cooler temperatures, its receipt is unlikely to increase the 
household’s indoor temperature. If a policymaker remained 
concerned by a household’s chosen temperature, in this 
specific instance an education programme expressing the 
benefits of higher temperatures might be more appropriate.
As with most academic studies of fuel poverty, due 
to data availability, Figures 2 and 3 are based on actual 
energy expenditures. The UK government’s official fuel 
poverty statistics are based on the expenditure ‘required’ 
to heat a home’s primary living area to 21oC. The intuition 
behind ‘required’ expenditure is that it avoids missing 
households from the statistics who severely limit their 
energy consumption (expenditure) because of low income. 
However, ‘required’ expenditures are arguably better 
described as ‘modelled’ expenditures, since they are 
derived from assumptions and modelling. Indeed, Figure 3 
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shows the intuition that fuel poverty rates based on actual 
expenditures should always be lower than those based on 
required expenditures, because of rationing, is false. Figure 3 
shows the relationship between fuel poverty rates based on 
actual and required energy expenditures varies through time, 
i.e. the solid line (actual expenditure) is sometimes above 
the corresponding dotted line (required expenditure). The 
difference between the two fuel poverty rates for the 10% 
metric is probably related to required energy expenditures 
being based on constant consumption while, actual 
expenditures reflect an increase in energy consumption 
when energy prices fall and a fall when energy prices rise.
Overall, Figure 1 demonstrates the higher ENEXShr of 
older pensioner householders may justify policy support, 
although, there is less evidence of need among younger 
pensioners. However, Figure 1 alone does not indicate that 
age-based, as opposed to income-based, interventions are 
more appropriate. In turn, Figure 3 highlights that steering 
policy according to expenditure based metrics is likely to 
direct resources to older households, who are less likely 
to self-identify as being unable to afford adequate warmth. 
This suggests a policymaker directing financial resources 
Figure 4 – Fuel Poverty Rates Using Actual and 
Required ENEX, 1995-96 to 20148 
Figure 3: The age profile of households judged fuel poor by 
alternative metrics, pooled data 2001-02 to 2008-097 
at older households must be confident the gap between 
metrics shown in Figure 3 is due to older households being 
particularly unwilling to report difficulties rather than reflecting 
their preferences. Together, Figures 2 and 4 demonstrate 
that the metric used to identify the ‘fuel poor’ significantly 
alters the apparent prevalence of fuel poverty and its 
movements through time. The welfare which households 
experience at any given point in time is, of course, 
independent of the metric chosen. 
The contrasting pictures from the different metrics may 
be possible to reconcile by combining the direct recording 
of in-home temperatures, with the same householders’ 
heating preferences and energy expenditures. While 
the large scale recording of in-home temperatures has 
previously been considered exorbitantly expensive, the 
roll out of smart thermostats potentially offers new data 
to study more precisely the issue of cold homes and to 
assess and improve the government’s fuel poverty policies. 
However, as the 2017 election campaign demonstrated, 
any reforms to WFP may ultimately be determined more by 
politics than evidence.
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Andreas Stephan, Professor of Law
Does the Prime Minister’s Unexpected 
Discussion of Competition Policy 
Signal a Softening of Brexit?
On Friday 2 March 2018, in a much-anticipated speech meant to give clarity to the UK Government’s Brexit 
objectives,1 the Prime Minister suggested that: (a) UK 
State Aid and Competition rules could remain aligned with 
those of the EU, and (b) UK courts could continue to have 
regard to judgments of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). Nevertheless, her speech also made it abundantly 
clear that the ECJ could not continue to have jurisdiction 
over the UK. While, on the face of it, this speech appears 
to reiterate Theresa May’s commitment to a ‘hard Brexit’, 
these significant concessions may signal a weakening of that 
resolve, as the Government acknowledges for the first time 
that – if the UK is to maintain a close trading relationship with 
the EU – the legal realities of Brexit will be complicated.  
Even before the PM delivered her speech, the Government 
confirmed it was targeting a border with the EU that was 
as ‘frictionless’ as possible. Yet it also maintained very hard 
lines on taking back control of immigration and denying the 
ECJ any continued jurisdiction over UK courts and laws. 
This appeared to make a trade agreement – i.e. something 
akin to the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) – the only viable option for the UK.
What has brought the realities of a hard Brexit into sharp 
focus are concerns over the border between the UK and 
the EU in Ireland. A return to customs checks (a ‘hard 
border’) could jeopardise the peace process in Northern 
Ireland. Yet the most sensible solution (giving NI a special 
semi-autonomous status of being part of the UK but also in 
regulatory alignment with the EU) risks bringing down the 
Conservative Government. They rely on the voting support of 
the Democratic Unionist Party, who want NI to have exactly 
the same Brexit settlement as Great Britain, so as to ensure 
the outcome does not increase the likelihood of an eventual 
Irish reunification.
So most commentators were expecting a softening in the 
Prime Minister’s stance last week, but few were expecting 
that softening to take the form of a discussion of competition 
policy. She began by making an important statement about 
the future influence of ECJ case law on UK law:
The second hard fact is that even after we have left the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ, EU law and the decisions of the 
ECJ will continue to affect us… When we leave the EU, 
the Withdrawal Bill will bring EU law into UK Law. That 
means cases will be determined in our courts. But, where 
appropriate, our courts will continue to look at the ECJ’s 
judgments, as they do for the appropriate jurisprudence 
of other countries’ courts. And if, as part of our future 
relationship, Parliament passes an identical law to the 
EU law, it may make sense for our courts to look at the 
appropriate ECJ judgments so that we both interpret those 
laws consistently.
She then went further, using competition policy to 
illustrate her point: If we want good access to each 
other’s markets, it has to be on fair terms. As with any 
trade agreement, we must accept the need for binding 
commitments – for example, we may choose to commit 
some areas of our regulations like state aid and competition 
to remaining in step with the EU’s. The UK drove much 
of the policy in this area and we have much to gain from 
maintaining proper disciplines on the use of subsidies and on 
anti-competitive practices.
These statements are significant because they represent 
the Government’s first significant departure from its 
characterisation of Brexit as a simple ‘in/out’ choice. What 
the Prime Minister is suggesting above, goes well beyond 
what might be expected from WTO rules (which do not 
include competition provisions per se) or from a Canada-
style trade agreement.
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The CCP Competition Policy Blog comments 
selectively on a variety of issues related to 
competition policy. It could be on something 
in the news, on policies from either the 
Government or agencies, or it could be 
on a new piece of academic research that 
particularly catches our eye. All our posts are 
founded in our understanding of the latest 
academic research and have been written to 
be accessible to practitioners, academics, 
students and journalists. 
For example, CETA contains a recognition of the 
importance of Competition policy to trading relations and the 
responsibility of each party to apply its domestic competition 
law. There is no requirement of equivalence in rules – indeed, 
EU and Canadian competition laws are very different in a 
number of respects. In terms of State Aid, the agreement 
requires parties to report certain subsidies to each other 
every two years and a non-binding mechanism through 
which each party must try and minimise the adverse effects 
of the subsidy on the complaining party’s interests. There 
is no requirement of pre-authorisation rules similar to those 
under EU State Aid Law.
Continued Supremacy of EU Law by the Backdoor?
In the first academic paper to be published on 
Competition Policy after Brexit, we identified that there 
was a strong advantage in UK competition law remaining 
closely aligned to EU law, so as to minimise the regulatory 
burden on businesses operating in both jurisdictions.2 
We also noted that it was not unusual for UK courts to 
consider the jurisprudence of closely related jurisdictions 
(such as Australia and New Zealand) when dealing with 
novel questions of law, even though they were under 
no obligation to do so. This was echoed in the work of 
the Brexit Competition Law Working Group,3 as well as 
in Richard Whish’s contribution to the House of Lords 
European Union Committee report on ‘Brexit: Competition 
and State Aid’.4 Whish suggested that, at the very least, UK 
authorities should be required to ‘have regard to’ EU law 
and precedent.
The Prime Minister’s statement, in fact, goes even further. 
The idea that competition and state aid rules should ‘remain 
in step’ may suggest a de facto obligation on UK authorities 
to follow EU jurisprudence. Indeed, the suggestion that 
Parliament might have to ‘adopt identical law to the EU’ also 
implies that – after Brexit – EU law will have a far greater 
influence on the UK than had been anticipated. Yet all this 
will occur without the UK having a say in the creation of new 
EU rules or the decisions of the ECJ, except via the limited 
levers that will be available through the trading agreement 
itself. As the junior partner in the relationship, the UK will 
largely become a rule-taker, reminiscent of the role that other 
small jurisdictions are forced into when dealing with much 
larger trading partners.
Without the UK’s continued participation in European 
institutions, the UK’s designated competition authority, 
the CMA, may find itself having to replicate the European 
Commission’s work, while being simultaneously bound to 
produce the same outcomes – something that would clearly 
constitute a waste of administrative time and taxpayer’s 
money. The Prime Minister herself acknowledged that the 
UK ‘drove much of the policy’ in EU Competition Law. Yet, 
it is precisely for this reason that EU competition policy will 
not necessarily continue along the same path we expect it 
to. With the UK’s influence gone, it may become less free-
market oriented and begin to depart from its effects-based 
approach. Similarly, the EU rules surrounding State Aid 
(which, as we point out in our paper, the UK is a clear net 
beneficiary of) may become more relaxed.
Conclusion: The beginning of a soft Brexit?
In conclusion, the Prime Minister’s discussion of 
competition policy is very sensible from a business 
perspective. A commitment to UK and EU competition 
and state aid rules remaining closely aligned will provide 
certainty and reduce the regulatory burden on firms wishing 
to invest in the UK. But, from a legal perspective, the speech 
raises more questions than it answers. What will the precise 
obligation be on UK authorities to stay closely aligned to EU 
rules? Under what circumstances will Parliament need to 
enact laws ‘identical’ to those of the EU? Will Competition 
Policy have a special status, or will this sort of arrangement 
extended to other areas? Will the UK accept being a ‘rule-
taker’, or does the Government expect to have some 
leverage over European lawmaking through the wording of 
the final agreement?
Now the door to continued alignment with EU rules has 
been opened slightly, many of the questions we thought 
were resolved (about the autonomy of UK law after Brexit) 
are now open once more. Indeed, the Prime Minister’s 
speech came only a week after the opposition Labour Party 
said it would pursue a Customs Union arrangement if it was 
elected to Government. The prospect of a softer Brexit now 
looks more conceivable than it did a few months ago; and it 
may all have started with a few seemingly innocuous words 
about competition policy.
Published on the CCP Competition Policy Blog, 4 March 2018
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It is a pleasure to be able to report that, due to the hard work of its 
members, CCP continues to flourish 
and to be able to fund its activities. In 
this positive climate, my decision to 
step aside as Director, after 7 years 
in the role, has been much easier to 
make. While I will continue to be an 
active member of the Centre, I am 
looking forward to returning to the rank and file. The process 
of identifying a new director has begun. 
This is the point in the year when we start looking forward 
to the annual conference. Taking place on June 7-8, we will 
again be hosted by the Enterprise Centre at UEA. This year 
the focus is on “Competition Policy and Industrial Policy: Is 
there a need for a new a balance”. This topic is particularly 
timely as the UK wrestles with what the future will look like 
post-Brexit and we see increasing tendencies globally for 
more industrial protection. 
The Centre’s research continues to expand and we have 
begun to interact with Computer Scientists at the University 
of Liverpool, reflecting an increased interest of CCP 
members in the impact on markets, and new possibilities 
in research methodology, of artificial intelligence and the 
availability of processing power to deal with large data 
sets. To fully appreciate the effect that the ability to profile 
consumers and firms may have on competition requires an 
extension of our interdisciplinary family to include computer 
science. The importance of this area is reflected in both the 
Government’s industrial strategy and in the annual plans of 
various competition and regulatory agencies.
As usual, the period since the last Research Bulletin has 
seen a turnover in Centre members and staff. We have 
welcomed as faculty members Pierre Bocquillon from the 
School of Politics, and Ratula Chakraborty and Wynne 
Lam from the Norwich Business School; and as research 
students Maksim Dogonkin from UEA Law School, Vicens 
Esteve Guasch, Israel Gottschalk and Vasudha Wattal from 
the School of Economics, and Jennifer Young from the 
School of Psychology; while Anne Johnsen has joined the 
admin team. We have also had to say goodbye to faculty 
member Sven Gallasch and research student members 
Carsten Crede, Antje Kreutzmann-Gallasch, Francesca 
Vantaggiato and Mengjie Wang.  
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